American foreign policy — both good and bad — has always been deeply influenced by Christian theology.

Note: This is part of FPIF’s new Religion in Foreign Policy Focus. for more, visit www.fpif.org.

American foreign policy is built on a deep foundation of Christian theology. Some of the people who make our foreign policy may understand that foundation. Most probably aren’t even aware of it. But foundations are hidden underground. You can stand above them, and even take a strong stand upon them, without knowing they are there. When it comes to foreign policy, we are all influenced by theological foundations that we rarely see.

For example, few Americans have read the work of Reinhold Niebuhr, the most influential American theologian of the 20th century. Many have never even heard the name. Yet Niebuhr’s thought affects us all. In the 1930s, he launched an attack on the liberal Christianity of the Social Gospel, a movement that powerfully influenced U.S. foreign policy in the first third of the 20th century. The liberals were starry-eyed fools, Niebuhr charged, because they trusted people to be reasonable enough to resolve international conflicts peacefully. They forgot the harsh reality of original sin.

Niebuhr wrapped that traditional notion of sin in a new intellectual package and sold it successfully, not only to theologians but to the foreign policy elite. Since the 1940s, foreign policy has largely been reduced to an endless round of debates about how to apply Niebuhr’s “realism.” Policymakers who still tried to follow the Social Gospel path have been marginalized and stigmatized with the harshest epithet a Niebuhrian can hurl: “unrealistic.”

It’s a Jungle Out There

Many policymakers, like much of the public at large, have come to find a strange comfort in the world as Niebuhr described it. They see a jungle where evildoers, who are all around, must be hunted down and destroyed. Though frightening, this world can easily become the stage for simplistic dramas of good against evil. And the moral certainty of being on the side of good — the side of God — can provide a sense of security that more than makes up for the constant terror. That was not what Niebuhr had in mind. But as he found out so painfully, once you let ideas loose in the world, you can’t control what others do with them.

Niebuhr would have been pained to see what the neoconservatives have done with his ideas. Their theory starts out from his own premise: All people are born naturally selfish and impulsive. The godfather of neoconservatism, Irving Kristol, was (like most of the early neocons) an intellectual — a teacher, writer, and editor — and (like many of the early neocons) a Jew. But he turned to Christian theology to describe his Niebuhrian view of human nature: “Original sin was one way of saying this, and I had no problem with that doctrine.”¹ Selfish impulses, when they get out of control, can tear society apart, he warned. To preserve social order we need a fixed moral order. We therefore need a clear sense of the absolute difference between good and bad, strict rules that tell us what is good, and powerful institutions that can get people to obey those rules.

According to this worldview, organized religion has been the most effective institution to promote moral absolutes and self-control. Religion now needs to be strengthened to stave off a rising tide of moral relativism that, along with secular humanism, is breaking down the bulwarks of social order and threatening to release a flood of selfish impulse to drown us all in chaos. A favorite neoconservative columnist, Charles Krauthammer, complains that American mass culture, dominated by skepticism and pleasure, is an “engine of social breakdown.” The best antidote would be a “self-abnegating religious revival.” Since that is not likely to happen, Krauthammer admits, the best place to recover moral discipline and will power is in foreign affairs: America must find the will to exercise its strength and become “confident enough to define international morality in its own, American terms.”²

Original Sin Goes Global

When neoconservatives apply their views to international relations, they deviate from Niebuhr’s teaching. All people may be sinners, they imply, but not all nations. They assume an (often vaguely defined) hierarchy of nations. At the bottom are the enemies of America, consistently described as chaotic, irrational monsters who are incapable of self-control and bent on provoking instability and evil for its own sake. Above them are neutral nations and then U.S. allies near the top of the pyramid. At the top is the United States, in a class by itself because its national motives are good and pure, somehow untainted by original sin.

Neoconservatives insist on this hierarchy, with its dramatic contrast between the good United States and its evil enemies, because it gives them the sense of moral clarity and certainty that they rely on to hold back the relativism they fear. They bolster their sense of certainty by reducing international affairs to simplistic myths: black-and-white tales of absolute good versus absolute evil. (Here I use the word “myth” in its religious sense of a narrative story that expresses a community’s worldview and basic values.) George W. Bush tapped into this mythic world when he said that the war on terrorism is “a monumental struggle between good and evil. But good will prevail.” The outcome is certain, according to Bush, because “we all know that this is one nation, under God.” But Americans must do their world-ordering job pretty much alone, since other nations and international institutions are too selfish to be trusted. The United States must rely primarily on military might, since the only language that the sinful evildoers understand is force.

The neoconservatives did not invent this myth. It goes back to the Puritan belief in “the new Israel” and Americans as God’s chosen people, with the special privilege and responsibility of bringing order to a sinful, chaotic world. Most Americans are still likely to see their nation as the global hero fulfilling that sacred task. Only the United States, they believe in a great leap of faith, is moved by an unselfish desire to serve the good of all humanity by spreading ordered liberty.

Throughout the Cold War era, across the political spectrum, there was no doubting the name of the threatening evil: Communism. After a decade of drift and uncertainty in the 1990s, the September 11 attacks, despite their horror, allowed the nation to breathe easier, at least in terms of the theology of foreign policy. Once again, it seemed that everyone agreed on the name of the monstrous sinners, the source of instability. Rudolph Giuliani could have been speaking for most Americans when he explained that the cultural payoff of the war on terrorism was moral stability: “The era of moral relativism…must end. Moral relativism does not have a place in this discussion.” That crusading tone of certainty gave Bush and the neoconservatives a very free hand in the early post-September 11 days, when they launched the invasion of Afghanistan. The administration then invaded Iraq with the approval of 75% of the U.S. public and nearly all the foreign policy elite.

Iraq War

The myth of U.S. moral and global supremacy - Americans as the world’s chosen people - went largely unchallenged until the U.S. venture in Iraq went sour. The myth says that the good guys are supposed to win every time, because they are good. When the myth does not get played out in reality, people start to complain. If you look at the current debate about Iraq from the standpoint of myth and theology, the complainers fall into three broad groups.

First there is the mainstream of the foreign policy elite, made up of Democrats and more moderate Republicans. They complain that the Bush administration is pursuing the right goals but using the wrong tactics. That’s because the elite still hold on to some shreds of the old Social Gospel view. They give most of the world a bit more credit for rationality; they fear the impulses of original sin a bit less. So they see military strength as one of several ways to secure America’s global hegemony. They are more willing to take a multilateral approach and use the carrot as well as the stick - to pull diplomatic and economic levers before calling out the troops.

But these differences, though they can be very important, are largely ones of degree and tactics. Across the board, members of the foreign policy establishment, even the liberal Democrats, still give a very respectful (sometimes slavish) hearing to the great theologian Niebuhr. But they apply his “realistic” view of original sin only to other nations. The liberals among the elite, too, want their sense of moral clarity and certainty reassured by seeing it played out in a global drama of good against evil. So they make a huge exception for the supposedly pure and innocent motives of their own nation, the chosen people. They believe that the U.S. has a higher moral standing, which gives us the right and duty to rule. That’s how they can justify the most ruthless policies against anyone who stands in their way.

The bipartisan elite may not value the display of American strength as an end in itself, the way neoconservatives do. They are willing to risk a short-term appearance of weakness in one place in order to bolster long-term U.S. strength everywhere else. But long-term strength (including a long-term military presence in Iraq) is still crucial, because they feel a sacred calling to enforce “stability” - their favorite code word for a single global order that protects U.S. interests - everywhere and forever.

The second group of war critics is on the right. A growing number of traditional conservatives criticize the administration and the bipartisan establishment for betraying genuine Niebuhrian “realism.” These hard-core “realists” want the United States to recognize that it too is a sinful nation, limited in its goodness as well as its resources, all too likely to overreach and eventually destroy itself if it doesn’t scale back its hubristic dream of enduring empire.

Thus the right-wing “realists” become strange bedfellows with the third group of war critics, the left-wingers, who, starting from very different principles, arrive at the same anti-imperialist conclusions. Though most of them don’t know it, what makes leftists leftist is that they still champion many of the basic values of the Social Gospel movement. They do not accept the doctrine of original sin; they don’t think people are inherently doomed to be selfish and unreasonable. They assume that the vast majority of people, if treated decently and given decent living conditions, will respond by being decent people. For the left, order and stability are not as important as human growth, creativity, and transformation. The key to a better world is not strength and dominance, but sharing and cooperation. And leftists often assume - or at least hope - that the long-term trend of history is leading to that better world, a view that is rooted in the biblical hope for redemption.

In Middle America

Leftists who are consistent extend their Social Gospel view to its logical conclusion: There are no monsters - no inherently bad people — only bad conditions. So the good guys versus bad guys myth always distorts reality. But a surprising number of leftists sacrifice logical consistency for the emotional pleasure of the traditional myth. For them, of course, the monsters are the Bush administration, the neoconservatives, sometimes the mainstream Democrats too, and always, above all, the corporate elite whose hand they see behind every gesture of U.S. imperialism.

This left-wing version of the myth does not play very well in middle America, or even on the coasts apart from a few ultra-liberal enclaves. The hardcore “realist” view may get slightly higher ratings, but not much. Most Americans still demand a heavy dose of moral idealism in their foreign policy. They want to continue believing in the myth of American innocence. They won’t give in to a full-blown Niebuhrian pessimism about human nature - at least not when it comes to American humans. And they don’t want to believe that the economic and political leaders of their nation are utterly cynical “realists,” devoid of ideals, caring only about money and power.

So the mass of the citizenry, sick and tired of losing in Iraq, swing in line behind the only critical voice they can support: the foreign policy elite. The public criticizes the administration for its inept effort in Iraq. But most citizens don’t raise any questions about the long-term goals or the theological premises underlying them.

Only when something looks broken do people think about fixing it. The last time the U.S. foreign policy system broke down was when the United States suffered defeat in Vietnam. However, after a short period of radical questioning, a powerful reaction set in, fueled by the deep and widespread need for idealism and moral certainty. The neoconservatives got control of the public conversation in the late 1970s because they recognized that need and offered a Cold War myth that satisfied it.

The same need for moral clarity arose after September 11, but it’s been bitterly betrayed by the failure in Iraq. How can we avoid a similar neoconservative reaction as we question the underpinnings of U.S. foreign policy in the years to come? And if the Iraq debacle boots the neoconservatives out of power for good, how can we use this window of opportunity to challenge the most powerful alternative view, the bipartisan establishment consensus? From the outset it won’t help to scorn the average citizen’s idealistic view of America. That’s like wishing away the Rocky Mountains. Claiming that this worldview is unrealistic would be caving in to a simplistic Niebuhrian “realism.” After all, we on the left believe in our own idealism. We are happy to hear right-wing “realists” argue that Americans are no more idealistic than anyone else. But we forget that Americans are no less idealistic either. That includes even the most powerful leaders of the nation. Rather than demonizing them and dismissing their claim to good intentions outright, we would do better to look for common values that we can all agree on and then find progressive programs that can put those values into practice.

Different Moral Certainties

Just about all Americans, from Bush and Cheney and the CEOs of Exxon and Lockheed-Martin on down, sincerely want the nation to be secure. As long as our notions of security are built on the myth of well-meaning Americans versus ever-threatening evildoers who embody original sin, we can never dispense with the evildoers. They are as necessary in U.S. foreign policy as sin is in Niebuhr’s theology. They always have to be out there threatening us, in our imaginations at least, in order for our pursuit of national security to make any sense at all.

The bipartisan consensus on U.S. foreign policy calls for us to be powerful enough to dominate them. But every step we take to dominate only antagonizes more people and makes some of them really want to harm us. As long as we keep on this self-defeating road, we are not a national security state. We are a national insecurity state. So, we need to redefine national security in a way that meets people’s need for a second value that so many of us share: moral certainty. This involves a faith in some rock-bottom kind of goodness in the world, which many Americans believe has a special home here in the United States.

There is a special kind of goodness, rooted in a special kind of theology, that does have an old and honored home here — the goodness of nonviolence. There have always been Christians who were certain that the only moral way to treat others, even enemies, is with love, not violence. They knew it because Jesus said it, right there in the Bible. In 19th-century America, the abolitionists and Thoreau turned the theology of nonviolence into a homegrown strategy for political change.

Martin Luther King, Jr. took this strategy a crucial step further. He preached that it’s the government’s role to help bring all people together in what he called “the beloved community” (something very much like what the Social Gospel called the Kingdom of God). Every government policy should promote “the mutually cooperative and voluntary venture of man to assume a semblance of responsibility for his brother [and sister]” — the responsibility to help every person fulfill their God-given potential.

In King’s words, no matter how bad a person’s behavior, “the image of God is never totally gone.” So, government must serve everyone, everywhere. No one can be written off as a monstrous evildoer, sinful beyond redemption. That was a moral certainty for King, an essential foundation of his religious faith. King knew all about moral clarity and certainty. He was willing to die for the truths he believed in so firmly. But he was not willing to kill.

A Different Narrative

With King as our guide, we could have a distinctly American foreign policy based on the conviction of absolute moral certainty we find in the Social Gospel and nonviolence traditions.. Our goal would always be to move the world one step closer to becoming a universal beloved community. We would no longer act out the myth of good versus evil. We would not demonize a bin Laden or Saddam — or a Bush or Cheney. We would recognize that when people do bad things, their actions grow out of a global network of forces that we ourselves have helped to create. King said it most eloquently: “We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny.”

We can never stand outside the network of mutuality, as if we were the Lone Ranger arriving on the scene to destroy an evil we played no part in creating. Just as Bush is tied to Osama, so each of us is tied to all those who do things that outrage us. We cannot simply destroy them and think that the outrages have been erased. To right the wrongs of the world, we must start by recognizing our own responsibility for helping to spawn those wrongs. Indeed, fixing our own part in the wrongs we see all over the world may be all that we can do.

But in the case of the United States in 2007, that alone would be more than a full time job for our foreign policy. We would have to, among other things:

• end the occupation that creates a breeding ground for violent jihadis in Iraq and Afghanistan;
• reverse the policy of supporting authoritarian regimes in the Middle East;
• stop participating in the mad rush for power and resources in Africa, which breeds disasters like Rwanda and Darfur;
• withdraw support for the corporations and financiers who would strangle the emerging popular democracies in Latin America;
• and treat everyone as our brothers and sisters, even the leaders of North Korea and Cuba and Iran.

In short, we would have to create a new notion of “national interest” based on the moral certainty that we are all threads in a network of mutuality that is the foundation of our national as well as individual life. Since our foundation is infinite and eternal, no one can threaten to destroy it, or us. Embracing that principle as the basis of foreign policy could set us on the road to a radically new way of thinking about genuine national security.

If that’s not something all Americans can agree on, at least it’s a program that gets the debate down to our most basic assumptions. This is a democracy. If the people want a religion-laden foreign policy based on the doctrine of original sin and the myth of good against evil, it’s what we should have. But at least we should all talk about it together, openly and honestly.

Notes

1. Irving Kristol, Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea (New York: Free Press, 1995), p. 5.
2. Charles Krauthammer, “When to Intervene,” The New Republic, May 6, 1985, p. 10.

Ira Chernus is Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder and author of Monsters To Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin. Email: chernus@colorado.edu

SOURCE PAGE @ Oklahoma Christian University Talon

Gleaned from COSMIC THERAPY

Why I marched on Washington

By Jonathan Carroll

By Jonathan Carroll on 09/21/07 at 11:00 AM
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IRAN-CONTRA

Excerpt:

“Midshipmen will not lie, cheat, or steal.”

- First seven words of the United States Naval Academy’s Honor Code

“There is great deceit, deception practiced in the conduct of covert operations. They are at essence a lie. We make every effort to deceive the enemy as to our intent, our conduct, and to deny the association of the United States to those activities … and that is not wrong.”

- Oliver North

(*refernce the post HERE for the commentators thoughts on deception in warfare and the Christian position)

James 5:12

Above all, my brothers, do not swear—not by heaven or by earth or by anything else. Let your “Yes” be yes, and your “No,” no, or you will be condemned.

source

CONTENTS

THE OCTOBER SURPRISE

ARMS FOR HOSTAGES

REAGAN’S AND BUSH’S INVOLVEMENT

IRAN-CONTRA INDICTMENTS

THE AFTERMATH OF IRAN-CONTRA

THE OCTOBER SURPRISE

The Iran-Contra scandal can be traced to the October Surprise during the 1980 Presidential election between incumbent Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. In the fall of 1980, Carter was marginally leading Reagan in the polls with the election right around the corner. The release of hostages before election day presumably would have insured the election for Carter. The Reagan team conspired to negotiate a deal with Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran. Campaign manager William Casey and George Bush met with Iranian Prime Minister Bani-sadr in Paris in October, only weeks before the election and with Carter having a slight lead over Reagan. Part of the deal cut between the Reagan team and Iran was to provide military weapons which Iran desperately needed in its war with Iraq. As it turned out, the 52 American hostages remained captive in Teheran. Carter’s popularity continued to plummet, enabling Reagan to be elected in November, and ironically the hostages were returned at 12 o’clock noon on January 21, 1981 when Reagan was inaugurated.

The first meeting regarding arms-to-Iran occurred in July 1980 in Barcelona, Spain and not in Madrid as was initially reported. The Republican team met at the Hotel Princess Sofia and at the Pepsico International headquarters. The American team was led by Republican campaign director William Casey, who months later was to be named CIA chief by Reagan, and by Robert McFarlane, who later became National Security adviser under Reagan. Three months after Barcelona, a more important meeting took place in Paris. CIA agent Richard Brenneke testified that Bush was in Paris on Sunday, October 19, 1980 when he met with members of the Khomeini regime to consummate an arms package to Iran. Bush, along with Casey and other government officials, flew to Paris on a BAC 111 on Saturday evening, October 18. The plane arrived in Paris on Sunday morning October 19 at 8:40 a.m. European time.

While in Paris, the Republican team gave $40 million to the Iranian government as a gesture of good faith that the Reagan team was serious in dealing with the terrorist Khomeini government — and that the 52 American hostages should remain captive until after the November election. After the meeting, Bush had to quickly return to the United States in order to deliver a speech at the Washington Hilton Hotel. He departed France in an SR-71 reconnaissance plane, piloted by Gunther Russbacher. The plane was refueled by an Air Force tanker nearly 2,000 miles out of Paris. The entire return flight to the United States was less than two hours.

When news of the Paris meeting leaked out, the CIA moved quickly to cover-up Bush’s meeting. CIA agent Frank Snepp wrote an article in the Village Voice, stating that the SR-71 pilot, Gunther Russbacher, was not capable of flying an SR-71 and, therefore, his allegations were false. However, in an interview between government whistle-blower Rodney Stich and Russbacher, it was very clear that Russbacher had been trained in flying the SR-71.

Several other witnesses corroborated the story that Bush was present in Paris. Ari Ben-Menashea, a member of Israel’s Mossad and involved in the transfer of arms to Iran, stated that Bush was at the meeting. Also, Iranian Prime Minister Bani-sadr produced documents indicating that Bush was present. On the other hand, CIA agent Donald Gregg, who was on the flight to Paris, failed a polygraph test when asked about Bush’s presence.

The Secret Service unequivocally denied the fact that Bush was in Paris. Yet, the agency refused to allow any of its agents who were assigned to Bush at that time, to testify. Justice Department prosecutors called two Secret Service agents who swore that Bush was in Washington, D.C. on that weekend. The Secret Service claimed that Bush was in Pennsylvania on Saturday, October 18; however, the agency did not produce any evidence to indicate Bush’s activities on the following day.

Under pressure by the Republicans, both the House and the Senate initially refused to investigate the October Surprise. However, eventually in 1991, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee made a token gesture and superficially did look into allegations of improprieties. The investigation was virtually blocked, since the committee prevented investigators from traveling to Europe to interview witnesses; denied subpoena power to investigators; limited the time frame of the investigation; and limited the funds to investigate alleged illegalities.

In addition, the committee called Russbacher an imposter and refused to accept his sworn statements. The testimony of Brenneke was discredited. The committee claimed that he was in Portland, Oregon on the weekend of the October 19, 1980, since he had used his credit cards on that day on the west coast. However, Barbara Honegger, a member of the Reagan-Bush campaign team and one who claimed that Bush was in Paris on October 19, reported that a handwriting expert examined the credit card signatures and swore that they were not those of Brenneke.

A year after the Senate’s “investigation” of the October Surprise, the House October Surprise Committee, chaired by Lee Hamilton of Indiana, was formed. However, chief counsel Lawrence Barcella, Jr. lacked credibility, since he earlier helped to conceal clandestine CIA operations in Libya. Also, Richard Pedersen, another key member of the investigation committee, had been involved in corruption. The House committee followed the pattern of its counterpart in the Senate and refused to hear testimony from anyone who had evidence that Bush was in Paris on the weekend of October 19, 1980. In 1993 the committee issued its final report which mirrored that of the Senate committee: the October Surprise was fabricated.

If the October Surprise did indeed occur, there would have been potential enormous consequences: the possibility of impeachment of high level government officials, including members of Congress; criminal activities of Republican Party nominees Reagan and Bush; and the exposure of illegal CIA activities.

Five months after the October Surprise and two months into his first term, Reagan gave CIA chief Casey the green light to begin clandestine activities to attempt to overthrow the Nicaraguan Sandinista government. For three years the Contras only killed innocent Nicaraguans and were incapable of seizing any villages. This frustration, coupled with the American public’s opposition to Reagan’s dirty war, influenced Congress to cut off aid to the Contras.

ARMS FOR HOSTAGES

“Since United States contact with Iran, there’s been no evidence

- President Ronald Reagan, November 13, 1986

In 1984, the CIA chief for the Middle East, William Buckley, was kidnaped by the Hezbollah which was operating out of Iran. Close sources to Reagan confirmed that he would do anything to obtain the release of Buckley. However, he was murdered several months later. This was followed by more abductions: Benjamin Weir, Father Jenco, Terry Waite, assistant to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and several professors from the American University in Beirut. The CIA and the National Security Council now moved to attempt to negotiate with Iran.

The NSC was composed of Vice President Bush, Secretary of State George Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, CIA director William Casey, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, and National Security adviser Robert McFarlane. On June 7, 1985, the NSC was given permission to deal with Iran which could exert pressure on the Hezbollah to release the American and British hostages.

The secret funding of arms, which was sold to “moderate Iranians,” was orchestrated primarily by North. Then the profits from the sales were used to send more weapons to the Contras in Central America. North controlled the secret and illegal treasury which financed “the Enterprise.” This consisted of CIA agents turned arms merchants, dummy CIA corporations, and clandestine Swiss bank accounts. The Enterprise took in $48 million in cash. Some was pocketed by arms dealer Albert Hakim and by General Richard Secord. Some of the money was funneled into the Middle East to pay for North’s failures in attempting to liberate the American hostages in Beirut.

Soon after the NSC was given permission to communicate with the Iranian regime, six separate arms deals took place.

**August 1985. 96 TOW missiles but no hostages were released. A DC-8 flew from Israel to Iran and transferred $1,217,410 into the Swiss bank account of arms dealer Ghorbanifar.

**September 1985. 408 TOWs were sold to Iran. One American hostage, Benjamin Weir, was released a day later.

**November 1985. 18 Hawk missiles were shipped to Iran via a Portugal and Israel. North arranged for the transfer of one million dollars which was placed into the bank account of Lake Resources, a CIA operated front to launder money in Florida. 80 Hawks were to be delivered; however, 62 were never delivered. North and Secord testified later that the money received covered the payment for the aircraft. $150,000 was actually spent for transportation, and $850,000 was diverted to the Contras.

**February 1986. 1,000 TOWs were sent to Iran in increments of 1,000 each and at $10,000 per missile. $10 million was placed in the account of Lake Resources. $3.7 million was used to pay for the TOWs. Of that amount, $6.3 million was profit.

**May 1986. $16.5 million was paid to the United States for spare parts for Hawk missiles. $6.5 million was given to the government, and $10 million was deposited in the bank account of Lake Resources. Two months later on July 26 Father Lawrence Jenco was released, and the remaining Hawk parts were sent on to Iran.

**October 1986. 500 TOWs were sold to Iran, David Jacobsen was released. $3.6 million was given to the United States. $2 million was paid for the missiles, while $1.3 million became profit.

On November 25, 1986, after a Lebanese newspaper broke the story of arms-for-hostages, Attorney General Edwin Meese revealed that illegal funds had been diverted to the Contras. Reagan downplayed the weapons which were delivered to Iran. He stated that TOW missiles were “hand held” and that they all could be “transported in one cargo plane.” Reagan also asserted, “The TOW anti-tank missile is a purely defensive weapon. It is a shoulder-carried weapon. And we don’t think that in this defensive thing — we didn’t add to any offensive power on the part of Iran.” The TOW missile weighed 56.3 pounds and was four feet long. The complete system required a crew of four people. In addition, TOWs could be used offensively by Iran to attack Iraqi tanks.

It took several days before North’s White House office was sealed, so he and his secretary, Fawn Hall, were able to shred damaging papers in this time period.

Reagan attempted to convince the public that his administration was not dealing with Khomeini but with “moderate elements” within the country. Reagan sent both McFarlane and North on a goodwill trip to Teheran to meet with Khomeini and to present him with an autographed Bible and a cake in the shape of a Bible. The Khomeini government refused to allow them to meet with anyone, and they only waited on the Teheran tarmac for several hours before returning to the United States. Because McFarlane’s frustration level increased and because he continued to wrestle with the unethical American covert operations, he resigned as Reagan’s NSC adviser and was replaced by Navy Admiral John Poindexter.

The next year, a joint Congressional hearing was created to investigate Iran-Contra. The committee granted immunity to North, thus forcing him to testify. North bragged that the United States carried out an illegal covert operation to fund the Contras in Central America. Since the Boland Amendment prohibited the funding of the Contras in their effort to overthrow the leftist Sandinista government in Nicaragua, the NSC sought other avenues. The first was to convince Congress to allocate funds for “humanitarian aid.” However, this money was used illegally to arm the Contras and was terminated after several months. Therefore, the NSC had to look for other sources of funds.

North testified that he took it upon himself to carry out “Operation Democracy.” He boasted that the profits from the illegal arms sales to the Khomeini regime were placed in secret Swiss bank accounts and that dummy CIA fronts such as Lake Resources in Florida. These funds were used to purchase weapons with which to arm the Contras in Central America. This was carried out by North along with Hakim, Secord, and Singlaub.

North skimmed $50,000 from a secret cash account which was set up by the Contras. Secord helped arrange for weapons which were illegally obtained with profits from the sales to Iran and then shipped south to the Contras. Hakim was a military sales agent who worked as a middleman with Secord. Hakim was quoted after President Carter’s aborted hostage rescue in Iran in 1979: “He couldn’t have been happier when the Carter administration needed.” Air Force General John Singlaub, who was president of the World Anti-communist League, became involved in raising funds overseas for the Contras in 1981.

On the domestic front, North solicited donations from various wealthy people. Claiming that communism was entrenched in Nicaragua and that it would move northward, he was able to solicit $80,000 from Adolph Coors. An $80,000 Cessna spotter plane, to be used in flights over Nicaragua, was purchased. North called wealthy widows, promising them photo sessions with Reagan if they made large contributions. One wealthy woman contributed $200,000 and was rewarded with a five minute meeting with Reagan. Billionaire Ross Perot supplied $2.3 million to North in an attempt to liberate Beirut CIA station chief Buckley in Lebanon. The sultan of Brunei contributed $1 million, and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia turned over $32 million.

North also lost more than $400,000 chasing false leads. An Iranian convince North that he was a Saudi prince with superior intelligence connections and was paid $15,000. An Armenian informant claimed that he knew the secret location of the American hostages. North slipped him $100,000, and he immediately disappeared in Syria. Lebanese “informants” received over $100,000 from North. Another Lebanese claimed that he had contacted Buckley, but it later turned out that Buckley had long been dead when he and North communicated. North also arranged for another informant to receive $200,000 of Perot’s money and $11,000 from illegal Contra funds in exchange for information. This informant produced no information to North.

“Midshipmen will not lie, cheat, or steal.”

- First seven words of the United States Naval Academy’s Honor Code

“There is great deceit, deception practiced in the conduct of covert operations. They are at essence a lie. We make every effort to deceive the enemy as to our intent, our conduct, and to deny the association of the United States to those activities … and that is not wrong.”

- Oliver North

“In the United States Naval Academy, nobody taught me how to run a covert operation.”

- Oliver North

This illegal financing — to operate an illegal war in Nicaragua — allowed a clandestine arm of the government to run itself. North was not accountable to anyone or to any agency. This was a direct assault on the American constitutional system. The laws of the United States were ignored and broken by a continuous series of lies. Presumably North believed that he was waging a war against the Sandinistas and many members of Congress.

REAGAN AND BUSH’S INVOLVEMENT

BUSH SEEMS TO LOSE HIS MEMORY. Plans to fund the Contras originally emanated from the office of the vice president. In the summer of 1982 Bush and Casey launched the Black Eagle Operation, a plan to ship weapons to the Contras through San Antonio, Texas and then on to El Salvador and Panama. According to a CIA operative, Bush agreed to use his office as a cover after Donald Gregg became the NSC adviser and coordinated the logistics of the operation.

Bush always claimed that he was “out of the loop” in the Iran-Contra scandal as well as the CIA’s involvement in drug trafficking while he was vice president. Plans to fund the Contras originally emanated from the office of the vice president. In the summer of 1982 Bush and Casey launched the Black Eagle Operation, a plan to ship weapons to the Contras through San Antonio, Texas and then on to El Salvador and Panama. According to a CIA operative, Bush agreed to use his office as a cover after Donald Gregg became the NSC adviser and coordinated the logistics of the operation.

In December 1983, Bush flew to Panama to meet with Noriega. This encounter was interpreted by Noriega as an appeal in training and arming the Contras. Jose Blandon was the top political aide to Noriega. When subpoenaed before the Senate investigating committee in 1988, Blandon testified that Bush asked for and received a commitment from Noriega to help secretly arm, train, and finance the Contras. In North’s 1989 trial, more evidence surfaced about the Bush-Noriega Contra connection. A Costa Rican-based Contra leader testified that he received $100,000 from Noriega in July 1984. Bush continued to plead ignorance about Noriega’s drug dealing activities. Blandon confirmed that the CIA used Noriega to funnel guns and money to the Contras and that Panama was used as a training base.

After the Boland Amendment outlawed further shipments of weapons to the Contras, the “Supermarket” began to covertly fly in weapons which were purchased with private funds. Bush always pleaded innocence, maintaining that he was never aware that funds were solicited from private individuals to purchase weapons for the Contras. However, a large amount of evidence indicated that Bush knew the precise details of how the “Supermarket” raised money and bought arms.

NSC adviser Gregg served in Vietnam with Felix Rodriquez, and later both worked in American intelligence. Rodriquez was recruited by Gregg to help supply the Contras with weapons. On September 18, 1984, Gregg claimed that he sent a memo to Bush, explaining the military and political aspects of the war. Gregg said that he told the vice president that the “Supermarket” was providing the Contras with about $1.5 million from private sources.

Telephone records proved that Gregg made a number of telephone calls from his home to the White House on December 15. Bush’s office officially acknowledged that Gregg and Rodriquez discussed Contra aid. The statement said that Gregg communicated with Rodriquez, but that they were never involved in directing, coordinating, or approving military aid to the Contras. Bush insisted that these contacts concerned weapons to El Salvador and not to the Contras.

On February 25, 1985, Poindexter wrote to Bush: “We want the VP (Bush) to discuss the matters with (Honduras President Roberto) Suazo.” On March 16, Bush flew to Tegucigalpa and met with the president and promised him that the United States would increase military aid to Honduras in return for helping support the Contras. Suazo was close to telling the White House that he would soon evict the Contras from Honduras. Bush assured the president that he would be rewarded if he would permit Contra camps in his country and if he would help to supply them with weapons.

White House aid to Honduras began almost immediately after Bush’s visit. Yet Bush categorically denied that he cut a deal with Suazo. The vice president said, “No implication, no quid pro quo, direct or indirect, from me to the president of Honduras.”

As vice president, Bush was a member of the NSC. He attended at least six documented meetings between May and October of 1986 and a total of at least 24 meetings in the 1980s. The arms-for- hostages plan was undoubtedly the primary agenda item at these meetings. One of the first meetings to discuss the plan to sell arms to Iran in exchange for American hostages held by the Hezbollah was on August 6, 1985. Bush was present when National Security adviser McFarlane outlined a scheme to attempt to retrieve the hostages.

Weinberger contended that Bush supported the arms-for-hostages, while he and Secretary of State George Shultz opposed the idea. Weinberger stated: “President Reagan decided to go with Israeli-Iranian offer to release our 5 hostages in return for the sale of 4,000 TOWs (anti-tank missiles) to Iran by Israel.” Weinberger’s notes read: “George Shultz + 1 opposed - Bill Casey Ed Meese (Attorney General) + VP favored.” Weinberger’s notes told of a straightforward swap of weapons for hostages: “Our 5 hostages in return for sale of 4,000 TOWs.”

Bush conceded that he supported the sale of arms but did not realize that it concerned the release of American hostages. Bush consistently said that he was “out of the loop.” In addition, he stated that Israel was not a third party in sending some arms to Iran.

After Reagan authorized the sale of arms to Iran on January 6, 1986, Shultz and Weinberger expressed their opposition. Weinberger confirmed that Bush was present at a White House meeting on the following day. The two cabinet members later testified to the Tower Commission that they disagreed with both Reagan and Bush on the arm’ sales. A few weeks later John Poindexter, the successor to McFarlane as National Security adviser, sent a memo to North acknowledging the high level opposition to the arms-for-hostages: “President and V.P. are solid in taking the position that we have to try.”

More evidence implicated Bush with the illicit funding of the Contra war after the Boland Amendment terminated congressional dollars. Ramon Milian Rodriguez, who served as the chief financial officer of the Medellin cartel, stated that Bush had connections with the Colombia cartels. Rodriguez informed Gregg in April 1986 that North was skimming profits from the arms sales. This directly implied that Gregg was aware of the efforts of North to arm the Contras. Yet Gregg maintained that he never informed Bush about the operation. The next month, Colonel Samuel Watson, an assistant in the NSC, met with Bush and Gregg to discuss the status of the Contras. The vice president was briefed on the status of the war, including the resupply network for the Contras.

On July 29, 1986, Bush met with Amiram Nir, Israel’s adviser on terrorism, at Jerusalem’s King David Hotel. Bush’s aide, Craig Fuller, took notes that explained that Nir hoped to gain the release of the hostages. According to Fuller, they discussed whether the arms destined for Iran would be delivered in separate shipments for each hostage as they are released. Bush later said that he could not recall much about the briefing and that he did not fully understand what Nir was referring to when he was talking about Iranian radicals. Bush said that he merely listened to Nir and that he did not know any details of the arms-for-hostages swap.

At his deposition during the Iran-Contra hearings, Contra leader Pastora testified that Bush was in the Contra resupply chain of command. Furthermore, records showed that after CIA operant Eugene Hasenfus’ was shot down over Nicaragua in October 1986, his first telephone call was made to the vice president’s office.

Despite the overwhelming evidence indicating that Bush was at several meetings where there were conversations concerning the arms-hostages swap, Bush continued to say that he was unaware of what transpired Even after the media broke the story, the vice president continued to maintain that he had been oblivious to the fact that illegal funds were being diverted to the Contras. Bush claimed that he had been informed by the Senate Intelligence Committee until a month later. The vice president contended that the entire operation to resupply the Contras was carried out privately and that no one in the White House was privy to process.

At the end of the Reagan administration, the Sandinista government still survived. Two years after Bush was elected president, Nicaragua was readying itself for the another election. The Bush administration pumped in $9 million to the 1990 election campaign of Violetta Chamorro. This is the equivalent of an enemy country spending $2 billion on an American election. It took Chamorro and 14 other parties to form the UNO coalition, and they barely defeated Daniel Ortega’s Sandinista Party. This brought to a close the 11 year war which cost the lives of more than 30,000 Nicaraguans. Most of the war’s casualties were civilians, since the goal of the Contras was to break the morale of those people. The United States government spent $300 million on the Contras, and private contributions never were totally accounted for. And the United States was able to sustain $15 billion in damage to Nicaragua’s infrastructure.

THE CHRISTMAS EVE PARDONS. In late 1992 — with only a month remaining in Bush’s presidency — Iran-Contra once again resurfaced. Bill Clinton had just defeated him in November in his bid for a second term. Reagan’s secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, was soon to be indicted for his part in Iran-Contra. Bush only had two months remaining before he would leave office. And Walsh was in his fifth year of investigating the players involved in Iran-Contra. Bush himself was well aware that there was a chance that he, too, could be subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury and perhaps be indicted.

C. Gordon Gray Reagan’s White House counsel for eight years, also served as Bush’s personal lawyer in those same years when he was vice president. In December 1992, Gray recommended that Bush pardon Weinberger as well as other Iran-Contra figures. If Bush pardoned only Weinberger, Gray believed, that would make it suspicious that the president would be covering himself. After all, Weinberger’s diary was in the hands of the independent counsel, and it contained evidence which could have implicated Bush. Additionally, possible personal testimony could also damage Bush’s credibility, since he had vehemently denied any role in Iran-Contra. Gray believed that all the high level Iran-Contra players should be pardoned. He believed that this would shield Bush from the charge that he was attempting to bring Iran-Contra to a swift conclusion so that he himself could never be implicated. The president had been convinced to go ahead and pardon Weinberger and other Iran-Contra figures who earlier had been convicted.

Gray contacted six high level officials who had been convicted of Iran-Contra crimes in order to see if they would accept a presidential pardon. Two CIA officials as well as former NSC adviser Robert McFarlane and former Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams agreed to a pardon. Gray helped Bush write a three page memo explaining the purpose of the pardons. Bush said that “the five have already paid the price — in depleted savings, lost careers, anguished families — grossly disproportionate to any misdeeds or errors of judgment they may have committed.”

On Christmas Eve, December 24, Bush issued the pardons. The president stated that Weinberger had been pardoned “not just out of passion or to spare the 75 year old patriot the torment of a lengthy and costly legal proceeding, but to make it possible for him to receive the honor he deserves.”

Bush then hired Griffin Bell’s law firm of King & Spaulding to investigate himself. After only three weeks, King & Spaulding issued its findings: Bush was not implicated in any wrong-doings in Iran- Contra. King & Spaulding did in three weeks what Walsh had begun seven years before. Even though Walsh was not finished with his probe, the Christmas Eve pardons brought the Iran-Contra investigation to a conclusion. Walsh was angry.

REAGAN’S MEMORY ALSO FAILS. Reagan attended four NSC meetings, but he also contended that he knew nothing of illegal arms shipments to Iran and illegal weapons sales to the Contras. In November 1986, a Beirut newspaper broke a story which explained that American arms sales to Iran.

A month earlier on October 8, 1986 Reagan was asked at a news conference: “Was there any United States involvement in this fight over Nicaragua — carrying the arms — any involvement whatsoever?” Reagan replied: “I’m glad you asked. Absolutely not. While they (three Americans, including Eugene Hasenfus) there is no government connection with that at all.” Then after the Reagan administration acknowledged that the United States was selling weapons to Iran, Reagan stated on November 19, 1986: “To eliminate the widespread but mistaken perception that we have been exchanging arms for hostages, I have directed that no further sale of arms of any kind be sent to Iran.” Reagan was then asked, “Didn’t the United States condone shipments of arms to Israel and other nations?” Reagan denied this charge by saying, “We did not condone and do not condone the shipment of arms.” Then Reagan was asked, “Could you explain what the Israeli role was here?” Reagan’s response was, “No, because, as I say, have had nothing to do with other countries or their shipment of arms.”

On December 8, 1986, Reagan stated, “Let me just say it was not my intent to do business with Khomeini to trade weapons for hostages, nor to undercut our policy of anti-terrorism.” On March 26, 1987 Reagan stated: “With regard to whether private individuals were giving money to support the Contras, yes, I was aware that there were people doing that. But there was nothing to my knowledge, of anyone whom I was aware of.” Two days later Reagan said, “As a matter of fact, I was definitely involved in the decisions about (private) support to the freedom fighters. It was my idea to begin with.”

Reagan told the Tower Commission that he “approved the shipment of arms by Israel to Iran” but later said that he was “surprised that Israelis had shipped arms to Iran.” Then he said that he had incorrectly remembered both instances.

In his 1990 autobiography, Reagan wrote: “To this day I still believe that the Iran initiative was not an effort to swap arms for hostages. But I knew that it may not look that way to some people. Unfortunately, an initiative meant to develop a relationship with moderate Iranians and get our hostages home took on a new shape I never expected and was never told about.”

“Mistakes were made and I tried to rectify them, first by appointing the Tower board to investigate,

then by reorganizing the National Security Council so that no one there could ever again take it upon himself to set foreign policy. In time, my ranking in the opinion polls rose. However, that never made me feel happy as some might think; it was as if Americans were forgiving me for something I hadn’t done.”

“If I could do it over again, I would bring both of them into the Oval Office and say, ‘OK, John (Poindexter) and Ollie (North), level with me. Tell me what really happened and what it is that you have been hiding from me. Tell me everything.’ If I had done that, at least I wouldn’t be sitting here writing this book still ignorant of some of the things that went on during the Iran-Contra affair.”

In November 1986, Reagan explained the TOW missile sales: “The modest deliveries could easily be put into a single cargo plane.” He also stated that the TOW missiles could be hand-held. Additionally, Reagan denied that Israel was used as a third country to help deliver arms to Iran. John Tower was appointed by Reagan to head a commission to investigate Iran-Contra. In less than a year the Tower Commission exonerated Reagan of any wrong-doing. In 1989 newly elected President Bush appointed Tower to be his Secretary of Defense. Knowing that the Senate would not confirm his appointment because of allegations of womanizing and alcoholism, Tower withdrew his name, since it was impossible for him to receive a majority vote in the Senate.

Reagan ignored the warnings that he was waging an illegal and inhumane war. Instead he decided to put his men to work, cutting deals with right wing dictators in order to finance the Contras in exchange for drugs.

IRAN-CONTRA INDICTMENTS

It is not a crime to deceive the American public as high officials in the Reagan Administration for two years while conducting the Iran and Contra operations. However, it is a crime to mislead, deceive, and lie to Congress when Congress seeks to learn whether administration officials are conducting the nation’s business in accordance with the law. Lawrence Walsh was hired as a special prosecutor to determine precisely if this had occurred. He subsequently found several upper-level Iran-Contra participants in violation of the law.

Several American laws were defied:

• The National Security Act. Select committees in both houses must be informed of all intelligence gathering by the CIA.

• The Hughes-Ryan Amendment (1974). The CIA may only use funds which are intended for obtaining necessary intelligence. The CIA must brief at least eight separate Congressional committees in regard to any covert action other than simple intelligence gathering.

• The Boland Amendment (1984). The United States cannot use funds to support any military operations in Nicaragua unless appropriated by Congress.

• The Neutrality Act (1794). It is illegal to initiate, organize, and/or provide money for military action against any foreign country which the United States is not officially at peace with. The United States had officially severed diplomatic relations with Iran which had been officially branded a terrorist nation.

• February 26, 1987: The Tower Commission issued its report on Iran-Contra, reprinting hundreds of notes exchanged by McFarlane, Poindexter and North.

• January 19, 1989: On the last day of the Reagan presidency, the National Security Archive filed a series of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests together with a lawsuit against President Reagan, to prevent the imminent erasure of the White House electronic mail backup tapes. On the eve of Bush’s inauguration, District Judge Barrington D. Parker issued a Temporary Restraining Order, prohibiting the destruction of the backup tapes to the PROFs system.

• September 15, 1989: United States District Judge Charles B. Richey ruled that the National Security Archive and its co-plaintiffs, including the American Historical Association (AHA) and the American Library Association (ALA), have standing to sue President Bush, in order to force him to comply with the retention requirements of various records acts which potentially cover the White House e-mail.

• January 25, 1991: After one and one-half years of legal procedural wrangling, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld Judge Richey’s ruling, denying the Bush administration’s attempts to have the case dismissed.

• December 1, 1998–November 20, 1992: On request from the plaintiffs, Judge Richey added the White House e-mail from the lame duck Bush administration to the case, issuing a restraining order preventing the Bush White House from destroying its own backup computer records.

• January 6, 1993: Judge Richey ruled that computer tapes containing copies of e-mail messages by Reagan and Bush White House staff must be preserved like other government records because the December 1, 1998 electronic versions were not simply duplicates of paper printouts, but contain additional information beyond the paper copies.
  • January 11 and 14, 1993: Judge Richey issued specific court orders requiring that the Bush White House preserve its computer records. In press interviews, Judge Richey stated that despite his orders, he believed that the Bush administration was planning to destroy its e-mail files.
  • January 15, 1993: In an expedited emergency ruling, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld and modified the rulings by Judge Richey, holding that government officials could erase White House and NSC computer files, as long as they preserved, on backup tapes, identical copies of what was being erased.
  • January 19, 1993: President Bush signed a secret agreement with Don Wilson, head of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), purporting to grant Bush exclusive legal control over the e-mail tapes of his administration. A staff team from NARA took custody of thousands of tapes and disk drives, hurriedly removing them from White House offices to prevent incoming Clinton appointees from gaining access to them.
  • February 16, 1993: NARA career staff, who managed the transfer, described in an internal memo how the so-called “midnight ride” had violated NARA’s own rules for records transfers and how several sets of tapes ordered preserved by Judge Richey had been lost, erased or damaged.
  • May 22, 1993: Judge Richey cited the Clinton White House and the acting Archivist of the United States for contempt of court for failing to carry out his order to issue new and appropriate guidelines for the preservation of the computer records of the Reagan, Bush and Clinton White House staff.
  • August 13, 1993: The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated Judge Richey’s contempt orders but upheld his overall decision that the Federal Records Act (FRA), requiring that complete electronic copies of e-mail messages be preserved by the White House, and by extension, government agencies in general. The appeals court remanded the case to Judge Richey to decide the issue of the dividing line between “agency” records covered by the FRA and presidential records covered by the Presidential Records Act.
  • March 25, 1994: In a brief filed in federal court, the Clinton administration declared that the National Security Council was not an agency, and should be accorded the protection from public scrutiny given to the President’s personal advisers. This argument attempted to remove the Clinton administration’s White House e-mail from the reach of FOIA requests and the FRA, arguing that all its documents were subjected only to the Presidential Records Act (PRA) and therefore not to court oversight.
  • December 13, 1994: The e-mail plaintiffs filed suit against the Acting Archivist of the United

  States to void the Bush-Wilson agreement, in American Historical Association et al v. Peterson.

  • February 15, 1995: Judge Richey rejected the Clinton administration’s arguments about the NSC’s status as “arbitrary and capricious… contrary to history, past practice and the law,” and declared that the National Security Council is an agency. The government subsequently appealed the decision, and the plaintiffs cross-appeal against a portion of Richey’s ruling that opened a loophole for senior NSC staff giving advice to the President.
  • February 27, 1995: In a separate opinion in the lawsuit over the Bush-Wilson agreement, Judge Richey declared the agreement “null and void,” writing that “No one, not even a President, is above the law.”
  • September 8, 1995: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit heard oral arguments in the case on the issue of Judge Richey’s decision and the agency versus Presidential status of the NS
• I’m here all week- S.S.

The Christian right has no religious legitimacy. It is a mass political movement. It ignores the core values of the Christian religion, summed up by Jesus in the sermon on the mount, and the core values of American democracy. They are not biblical literalists as they claim- but selective literalists choosing bits and pieces of the Bible that conform to their ideology and bigotry and ignoring, distorting or making up the rest. ~Chris Hedges

More than five years after President Bush created the Office of Faith-Based Initiatives, the former second-in-command of that office went public with an insider’s tell-all account that portrays an office used almost exclusively to win political points with both evangelical Christians and traditionally Democratic minorities. See “Tempting Faith” an expose’ on how the GOP and the presiding admin. seduced and used the evangelicals for political power HERE at Christianbook.com.

Scott Starr said…

Ahhhh yes, when faith meets politics…

…its sorta like when Church meets the State, the World meets Chrisitianity, an Indian meets with a Uncle Sam bearing a treaty … or when…er….faith meets politics…

“We tried to tell them,”- Chief “Runs With Scissors”- Blacktoe Tribe

After the catastrophic Bush administration does anybody still think having Christians attempt to overtake political structures is a good thing? I maintain rendering into Caesar what is Caesar’s and letting the Church BE the Church is best for both Church and State- instead of the Church co-opting itself to the “World” ( I consider the idea that we Christians can control humanity by employing the infernal methodology of wordly politics and/or military might in the first place to be a very “liberal” - even humanist notion). Wake up.

Also click on the header below to learn more about:

The Evangelical Roots of American Unilateralism: The Christian Right’s Influence and How to Counter It.

Scott Starr said…

I can personally attest to being in the same room with a drunk George W. Bush on two occaisions- both between 1997 and 1999- well after he allegedly gave up drinking and after he started claiming sobriety and running for president.

So, apparently the image he constructed to win the support of evangelical Christians was a taylor made and yet false one.

The Christian right has no religious legitimacy. It is a mass political movement. It ignores the core values of the Christian religion, summed up by Jesus in the sermon on the mount, and the core values of American democracy. They are not biblical literalists as they claim- but selective literalists choosing bits and pieces of the Bible that conform to their ideology and bigotry and ignoring, distorting or making up the rest. ~Chris Hedges

More than five years after President Bush created the Office of Faith-Based Initiatives, the former second-in-command of that office went public with an insider’s tell-all account that portrays an office used almost exclusively to win political points with both evangelical Christians and traditionally Democratic minorities. See “Tempting Faith” an expose’ on how the GOP and the presiding admin. seduced and used the evangelicals for political power HERE at Christianbook.com.

Scott Starr said…

Ahhhh yes, when faith meets politics…

…its sorta like when Church meets the State, the World meets Chrisitianity, an Indian meets with a Uncle Sam bearing a treaty … or when…er….faith meets politics…

“We tried to tell them,”- Chief “Runs With Scissors”- Blacktoe Tribe

After the catastrophic Bush administration does anybody still think having Christians attempt to overtake political structures is a good thing? I maintain rendering into Caesar what is Caesar’s and letting the Church BE the Church is best for both Church and State- instead of the Church co-opting itself to the “World” ( I consider the idea that we Christians can control humanity by employing the infernal methodology of wordly politics and/or military might in the first place to be a very “liberal” - even humanist notion). Wake up.

Also click on the header below to learn more about:

The Evangelical Roots of American Unilateralism: The Christian Right’s Influence and How to Counter It.

Scott Starr said…

I can personally attest to being in the same room with a drunk George W. Bush on two occaisions- both between 1997 and 1999- well after he allegedly gave up drinking and after he started claiming sobriety and running for president.

So, apparently the image he constructed to win the support of evangelical Christians was a taylor made and yet false one.